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Altruism is a cooperative behavior by which a donor individual incre ases a recipient's fitness at the cost of its own fitness. Major progress in the s tudy of the evolution of altruism has been made over the last decade on both theoretical and e mpirical sides. On the theoretical side, models have gained a significant dose of reali sm from the explicit inclusion of spatial factors and the consideration of conditional behavior (Nowak and May 1992; Ferrière and Michod 1995; Roberts and Sherrat 1998) . On the empir ical side, ecological and genetic determinants of altruistic behavior hav e started to be identified, and physiological costs and benefits have been measured (C respi 1996; Bourke 1997; Cockburn 1998; Heinsohn and Legge 1999) . However, the merging between theory and facts has led to conflicting interpretations of processes and patterns in the evolution of altruism.
Two main processes have been put forward to explain the evolution a nd maintenance of altruism: kin selection (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) . Kin selection initially met with great success in explaining empirical observations (for example in social insects). However, recent theore tical developments, based on spatially implicit models, have pointed out a critical issue in this framework: the deleterious effects of kin competition should cancel out the indirec t benefits of an altruistic behavior, thereby preventing the evolution of altruism (Taylor 1992a (Taylor , 1992b Wilson et al. 1992; Queller 1992 Queller , 1994 . In contrast, game-theoretic spatial models involving conditional reciprocity have shown that reciprocal altruism e volves readily in spatially heterogeneous populations (Nakamaru et al. 1997 (Nakamaru et al. , 1998 . These theor etical findings are altogether in sharp contrast with empirical advances . On the one hand, unequivocal evidence is lacking for the expectedly widespread occurr ence of reciprocal altruism, and reciprocity involves already fairly elaborate be havioral mechanisms (e.g., memory of past interactions) that are unlikely to be relevant to our understanding of the evolution of primitive forms of altruism (Pusey and Packer 1997) . On the other hand, kin selection is still regarded as essential to explain the tr ansition from selfish to cooperative units at all levels of biological organization (Maynard -Smith and Szathmary 1995) , and many empirical examples of the specific transition from solitary to social life in animals seem indeed to fall under the scope of kin selection (Bour ke 1997; Emlen 1997) .
Widely different patterns of altruistic behavior have been described in a large array of taxa spread across bacteria, slime moulds, arachnids, insects a nd vertebrates. Levels of altruism, as described by the qualitative and quantitative nature s of the investment by donors and benefit to recipients, have been found to vary between different species (Edwards and Naeem 1993; Crespi 1996) or within the same lineage acr oss evolutionary time (Jarvis et al. 1994; Wcislo and Danforth 1997) , between differen t populations within the same species (Spinks et al. 2000) and between groups of individual s within the same population (Cockburn 1998; Velicer et al. 2000; Strassmann et al. 2000) . Most models have aimed at understanding how altruism can evolve in a self ish world, and how altruists can persist in the face of cheaters that rea p the benefits of altruism while providing less or no help. Yet little theory is currently available to probe the adaptive significance of such variation in patterns of altruism and to identi fy physiological, ecological and genetic determinants.
This study offers a theoretical framework to address these tensions .
We consider a population of asexual organisms that live in a spatially homogeneous, tem porally constant habitat where competition and cooperation take place between kin and non-kin neighbors (van Baalen and Rand 1998) . First, we address the robustness of previous investigations that questioned the role of kin selection for the evolution of altruism. To this end, we relax two of their critical assumptions. A dose of mov ement may help export the local benefits of altruism. Thus, we expect the conclusi on that kin competition cancels kin cooperation to be sensitive to the inclusion and i ntensity of individual mobility (Queller 1992) . We therefore relax the "pure visc osity" hypothesis according to which individuals (except offspring) are sessile (H amilton 1964; Taylor 1992a,b) . In our model, offspring are born locally, but in contrast with m ost viscous population models, individuals move during their lifetime (van Baalen and Rand 1998) . Also, most kin selection models assume that the population is saturate d and constantly maintained at carrying capacity. This lack of environmental "el asticity" might prevent the spread of altruism (Queller 1992, Mitteldorf and Wilson 2000) . To overcom e this restriction we assume that population regulation arises locally from the limited empty space being available for offspring. In our model the habitat is not saturated, because occupied sites coexist with empty sites generated by demographic stochasticity (Ferrière and Le Galliard 2001) .
Second, we want to understand adaptive variation in altruism from basic physiological, ecological and genetic properties that could be docume nted in natural populations. This is achieved by assuming that altruism is not an al l-or-nothing behavior and is better modeled as a quantitative trait that measures the amount of time, energy or resources invested in the altruistic function (Doebeli and Knowlton 1998; R oberts and Sherrat 1998; Koella 2000) . At the physiological level, populations or spec ies may differ according to the pattern of energy allocation to altruism versus other costly functions (Heinsohn and Legge 1999) . We therefore assume that the physiolog ical cost of altruism relates quantitatively to the actual altruistic i nvestment. However, in contrast with previous models (Doebeli and Knowlton 1998; Roberts and Sherrat 1998) , we envision three alternative costs patterns: a decelerating, a linear and an accelerating dependence of costs on investment in altruism. At the level of ecolog y, populations or species may also differ with respect to interaction structure. Two determinants of this structure are habitat connectedness and individual mobility (Ferrièr e and Michod 1995, 1996; Nakamaru et al. 1997; Frank 1998) . Introducing specific parameters for these two factors allows us to investigate their effect on the adaptive evol ution of altruism. At the level of the genetic processes, mutation rates and mutational ef fects determine the population phenotypic diversity upon which selection operates. Our study addres ses to what extent variations in these basic genetic features can contr ibute to variations in adaptive patterns of altruism.
From a methodological point of view, we develop a model of population dy namics based on spatial correlation equations (Matsuda et al. 1992; van Baalen a nd Rand 1998; Rand 1999; Ferrière and Le Galliard 2001) to study the evolutionary d ynamics of altruism in the framework of adaptive dynamics theory (Metz et al. 1996; Dieckmann and Law 1996) . The central notion is that selective pressures actin g on mutant phenotypes are generated by the background population dynamics of re sident phenotypes. After identifying selective pressures and incorporati ng them in a deterministic model of , we provide a classification of adaptive patterns of altruism according to the shape of physiological costs, the levels of individual mobility and adaptive dynamics the degree of habitat connectivity. The stabilit y of the evolutionary endpoints and the effect of large mutations are investigated to gain insight into how variation in the mutation process may determine the adaptive outcome.
Finally, the robustness of the salient conclusions drawn from our analytical study is tested against stochastic, individual-based simulations.
Model assumptions
We consider a population of haploid individuals that inhabit a network of hom ogeneous sites, modeled as an infinite lattice (Appendix 1). Each site m ay be empty, or occupied by one individual. Each site is randomly connected to a set of site s that defines a neighborhood (Appendix 1). We assume that every site is connected to the s ame number of sites, n. Thus, the neighborhood size n provides a measure of the habitat's connectedness.
Mobility and interaction are defined locally, at the neighborhood scal e. During any small time interval, an individual may move to an empty site wi thin its neighborhood, reproduce by putting an offspring into an empty neighboring site, or die . The per capita mobility rate m and death rate d are unaffected by local interactions. Mobility is assumed to be costly to the individual, with a permanent negative effec t on the individual's birth rate. This is expected in organisms where a stron ger ability to move, resulting from specific structures (e.g., gliding flagella or muscles), imposes a developmental or maintenance cost. For example, the dispersive morph in t he naked mole rat diverts more energy into growth and fat storage to compensa te for the risks of moving in inhospitable habitats (O'Riain et al. 1996) . The cost of mobilit y is assumed to impact linearly on the intrinsic birth rate such that the net per capita birth rate (in the absence of interaction) is given by We assume that two types of local density-dependent factors aff ect movement and reproduction (Appendix 1). First, both movement and reproduction are conditional on the availability of empty sites within the neighborhood. Thus, local crow ding negatively affects the rates of mobility and birth. Second, reproduction is enhanc ed by altruistic interactions with neighboring individuals, which induces a positive effec t of local crowding. Here we assume that an altruistic interaction improves the quality of neighboring sites. This may involve storage of resources, habitat eng ineering, or signaling. The altruistic phenotype is defined by the per capita rate of investment u into the altruistic function. The altruistic behavior is directed evenly toward all neighboring sites, regardless of the presence or phenotypes of neighbors. In e ffect, every neighbor of a focal individual that invests at rate u into altruism receives a birth rate increment equal to n u (Wilson et al. 1992) . Therefore, altruism is only effective in pr actice provided some recipients are present in the neighborhood of the donor and some spa ce is available in the neighborhood of the recipient for its offspring. We use the terms selfishness to describe a phenotype that does not invest in altruism ( 0 = u ) and quasiselfishness to refer to a phenotype that hardly invests in altruism (
We further assume that altruism involves a physiological cost on the donor's reproduction, and we distinguish three patterns of dependence of costs on th e investment in altruism: accelerating, linear, and decelerating ( Fig. 1) . With accelerating costs, the increase of the cost resulting from an increased alt ruistic investment becomes disproportionately larger as the initial investment increases. For example, in the cooperative bird Corcorax melanorhamphos physiological costs are detected only among individuals that invest strongly in altruism (Heinsohn and Cockburn 1994 ). Mutations cause the altruistic phenotypes of offspring to differ from those of their parents. Mutations occur with a fixed probability per birth event, de noted by k. The mutant phenotype is obtained by adding the mutation effect to the prog enitor phenotype. Mutation effects are drawn randomly from a normal probability distr ibution, with zero mean and a mutational variance σ 2 .
The resulting polymorphic, stochastic process can be simulated on a finite lattice (Appendix 1). Table 1 summarizes the used notation.
Spatial population dynamics of residents
Selective pressures acting on a mutant phenotype result from the int eraction between the initially scarce mutant population and the resident background population.
The finite size of the interaction neighborhood and the finite range and rate of dispe rsal and fecundity cause spatial fluctuations and spatial correlations to develop in population density (Dieckmann and Law 2000) . Thus, spatial population heterogeneity devel ops in a spatially homogeneous habitat. We use the framework of correl ation equations to derive an analytical model describing the spatial dynamics of such a background population (Appendix 2). Assuming that mutation occurs rarely, the background population may be considered as monomorphic (Dieckmann and Law 1996; Metz e t al. 1996) . In this section we apply the polymorphic, ecological model to the s pecific case of a monomorphic population. This will provide the basic ingredients needed in t he next section to model the dynamics of a mutant phenotype situation in this resident population.
Let us consider a single phenotype x which invests in altruism at rate x u . The temporal dynamics of a population of x can be described by tracking over time t the frequency ) (t p x of occupied sites. These dynamics depend on the neighborhood composition, described by the local frequencies x i q , i.e. the probabilities that an occupied site is neighbored by at least one site in the state i (Matsuda et al. 1992 ). The frequency x p i obeys the ordinary differential equation 
A closed system of correlation equations for the dynamics of local frequencies is constructed in Appendix 2 by maki ng use of the standard pair approximation (Matsuda et al. 1992; Rand 1999; Iwasa 2000; van Baalen 2000) .
At equilibrium, the spatial structure of a monomorphic population depends on the mobility rate and the altruistic investment (Appendix 3). The spatia l structure is characterized by some degree of aggregation (Fig. 2) . The spat ial structure vanishes at high mobility rates, and for large birth rates, because birth i s associated with offspring dispersal. More aggregation is found in organisms with low mobility, a nd also in organisms with very high mobility that consequently incur a severe re duction of their birth rate (due to the cost of mobility). The relationship between altruism and aggregation depends on the pattern of cost. In species with linear a nd decelerating costs, strongest aggregation is observed at low altruistic investment (
Figs. 2B to D). In species with accelerating costs, strongest aggregation is observed in org anisms with low altruism, or with high altruism, when the birth rate is drastica lly reduced by the cost of altruism (Fig. 2F) . For some parameter combinations, extinction is the only stable popula tion equilibrium (Fig. 2) . Extinction results from the total cost of mobi lity and altruism not being compensated. High mobility causes extinction because it implies a large direct cost that depresses the intrinsic birth rate ) (m b , along with the reduction of the indirect benefits of altruism due to the loss of local aggregation. Species wi th accelerating costs can also undergo extinction at high investment in altruism (Fig. 2F) . In all other cases, the altruistic population is viable and two types of population dynami cs can be distinguished (Fig. 2) . Borrowing terminology from the field of mut ualism studies, we call the corresponding phenotypes facultative versus obligate. Thus, a ltruism is said to be facultative when the population growth rate in the limit of very low population density, (Fig. 2A) .Altruism is said to be obligate when the limit growth rate is negative and the population dynamics thus show bistability. In the latter case, the positive equilibrium is local ly stable and coexists with the extinction equilibrium, which is also locally stable. A population of obligate altruists may attain the viable equilibrium state only if its initial de nsity lies above a critical threshold ( Fig. 2A ). This phenotypic state is therefore associated with low colonization ability and an elevated risk of extinction, since a viable population c an neither be established from an initially low density nor be maintained below a critical density threshold.
Spatial invasion fitness of mutants
The invasion fitness of a mutant is defined by its per capita growth rate while being rare in a resident population at ecological equilibrium (Metz et al. 1992) .
In the present section, we analyze the growth of such a small mutant population in a resident population as described in the previous section (Appendix 4).
The invasion dynamics of a rare phenotype involves three phases (va n Baalen 2000; Fig. 3 ). In a first, short phase, the small mutant population locally spreads from a single mutant individual up to the point where the mutant population attains a pseudo -equilibrium correlation structure. The build-up of this structure is hi ghly stochastic but occurs with certainty on a finite time scale (Matsuda et al . 1992) . Indeed, the cost of altruism dooms any single altruistic mutant in an established popul ation of selfish individuals. Drift is first needed to drive the mutant population to its pseudo-equilibrium spatial structure. Also, the initial spread of the mutant depends on the local spatial structure of the resident population. For example, an altruistic muta nt that arises in a neighborhood where selfish residents are more frequent than expected on average will face an increased risk of extinction. Denoting the mutant by y , we use the pseudoequilibrium local frequencies q of (respectively) empty, resident and mutant sites around a focal mutant site to describe this transient structure. These statistics are calculated in Appendix 5. Conditional on non-extinction during this first phase, the mutant dynamics then enter the second phase during which the mutant population expands or contracts while its population keeps its pseudo-equilibri um structure and the resident population remains close to its own equilibri um (Fig. 3 ). Spatial invasion fitness can be defined as the mutant population growth rate during this second phase (van Baalen and Rand 1998) . A positive fitness implies that the invasion process enters a third phase during which the mutant phenotype displaces the resident (Fig. 3) , while a negative fitness implies mutant population extinc tion. 
Notice that the benefit of altruism (second and thi rd terms) is measured conditionally on the presence of at least one empty site for breedin g and depends upon the amount of help received from 1 − n (not n) neighboring sites and the local frequency of empt y sites y q 0 . This expression bears an interesting relationship t o the notion of direct or neighbormodulated fitness of additive behavioral effects (F rank 1998). Direct fitness is derived by summing the effects on a focal individual's fitn ess of all phenotypes present in the neighborhood (including the focal individual itself ). Likewise, the spatial invasion fitness of a focal mutant is obtained by adding to the mutant neighbor-independent fitness (first term) the effects of a resident neig hbor (second term) and that of a mutant neighbor (third term), weighed by the probabilities of occurrence of such neighbors.
Selective pressures
We now derive a simplified version of the spatial i nvasion fitness to analyze the selective pressures acting on the altruistic trait under small mutational steps. This will be the basis for studying the evolutionary dynamics of altruism. By using the fact that the resident's fitness in its own environment is al ways zero,
, the selection derivative can be derived from a first-order approx imation of the spatial invasion fitness, and equals 
where a measures the gain (or loss) of open space in a mut ant's pseudo-equilibrium neighborhood relative to the resident's at equilibr ium (see Appendix 5 for details). This expression exhibits three selective pressures drivi ng the evolution of altruism. The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (3) quantif ies the pressure for increased investment in altruism. The second term measures th e pressure for opening free space in an individual's neighborhood. The last term measure s the pressure for reducing the physiological cost of investing in altruism.
Extensive computations suggested that the pressure for opening space, albeit not vanishing, is negligible compared to the two other selective components (Fig. 4) . This implies that
, hence 0 ≈ a in the Equation (3) (see Appendix 5). This also implies that as long as the mutant phenotype stays rare, the resident correlation structure is redistributed over the pairings of mutants with their own type and the resident type:
Thus, the mutant is less aggregated than expected when common, and therefore rare mutants are less likely to interact among themselves during the initial phases of invasion (Fig. 3) . Globally, the evolutio n of altruism is not limited by competition for empty sites within the invasion str ucture, and the condition for an adaptive increase in altruism,
This condition is a spatial form of Hamilton's rule (see also Michod 1995, 1996; Frank 1998; van Baalen and Rand 1998) . The ri ght-hand side is the marginal cost of altruism. The left-hand side measures the margin al benefit of altruism, weighed by the average frequency y y q of recipient neighbors that are phenotypically ide ntical to the focal mutant individual. For a haploid mutant popul ation descended from a single mutation event, the identity in phenotype is equiva lent to the identity by descent, and y y q provides a measure of relatedness (Day and Taylor 1998) . The mutant relatedness can be expressed as a functi on of the resident population structure (Appendix 5), hence in terms of the basic demographic, mobility and lattice parameters, according to the following equality 
Thus relatedness is higher in a population with low er 
Canonical equation of adaptive dynamics
We use the results of the previous section to devel op a deterministic model of adaptive dynamics under small mutations. This allows us to i dentify general patterns in the adaptive dynamics of altruism, to characterize the evolutionary endpoints and to study transient evolutionary dynamics. In a large populat ion where mutations are rare and mutational steps are small, the stochastic mutation -selection process can be approximated by a deterministic process whose traje ctories are the solution of the socalled canonical equation of adaptive dynamics (Die ckmann and Law 1996):
The bracketed term captures the effect of mutations , involving the mutation probability k, the mutation step variance σ 2 , and the equilibrium population frequency given by the selection derivative (Marrow et al. 19 92) that we approximate according to Equation (4) by
The resting points that satisfy
are called evolutionary singularities and correspond to phenotypic states where the selection derivative vanishes (Marrow et al. 1992) . Thus, at an evolutionary singularity, the ma rginal cost of altruism balances exactly the marginal benefit weighted by mutant rel atedness. A singularity u* can be locally evolutionarily attractive ("convergence sta ble"), or acts as an evolutionarily repellor.
Classification of Adaptive Dynamics
We develop a classification of the adaptive dynamic s of altruism depending on the cost pattern specified by parameters κ and γ . To this end, we perform a numerical bifurcation analysis of the evolutionary singularit ies generated by (6) and (7) with respect to the mobility rate. We obtain five generi c bifurcation diagrams as parameters κ and γ are varied (Fig. 5A ).
For a decelerating cost of altruism, there is a sin gle positive singularity that is unstable for any mobility rate (Fig. 5B) . For linea r costs, two cases can be distinguished. Either the selfish state undergoes a transcritical bifurcation as mobility increases, turning from unstable to stable and then coexisting with an unstable positive singularity. This is characteristic of "weak linear costs" (Fig.  5C ). Alternatively the selfish singularity remains stable irrespective of the mobi lity rate, which characterizes "strong linear costs" (Fig. 5D) Lettering refers to panels B to F showing bifurcation diag rams of the evolutionary singularities with respect to the mobility rate. In B-F, plain black curves are sets of convergence stable (attracting) singularities; dashed black curves are sets of convergence unstable (repelling) singularities. Population extinction occurs in black regions. Arrows indicate the direction of selective pressures at particular values of the mobility rate. Filled circles: attractive evolutionary singularity; open circles: repelli ng evolutionary singularity; triangles: evolutionary self-extinction. B, Species with decelerating costs.
Inner singularities are repelling, resulting in bistable adaptive dynamics. C, Species with weak linear costs. Below a mobility threshold, altruism invades a purely selfish population and increa ses monotonically; above the threshold, the adaptive dynamics are bistable. D, Species with st rong linear costs. Pure selfishness is globally attractive. E, Species with slowl y accelerating costs. High altruistic investments are selected at low mobility. At higher mobility, an unstable singularity separates the basins of attraction of two locally attracting singulari ties that differ dramatically in their level of altruism (high altruistic investment versus quasis elfishness). F, Species with rapidly accelerating costs. The adaptive dynamics typically converge to a globally stable singularity. In all cases (not shown in B), the adaptive process can hit a region of extinction when the population originates from an ancestral state characterized by high mobility and intermediate or high altruism. Values of parameters κ and γ in B to F are the same, respectively, as in Fig. 2B to F. In all panels 1 . 0 = ν . Although highly mobile organisms could persist on t he ecological timescale provided that they behave sufficiently altruistically, the a daptive process would drive their altruistic investment down to the point where the p opulation becomes non-viable. Increasing the size of the neighborhood selects str ongly against altruism. The whole patterns are not sensitive to variations in the mobility cost parameter ν .
Decelerating Costs
With decelerating costs, there is a single, repelli ng evolutionary singularity for any mobility rate, and adaptive dynamics exhibit bistab ility (Fig. 5B) . At the evolutionary singularity, the positive selective pressure on alt ruism resulting from mutant relatedness and the negative pressure exerted by the physiologi cal cost balance exactly. The evolutionary singularity increases with the mobilit y rate, which is due to the effect of increased mobility on mutant relatedness as describ ed by Equation (5). Since the cost pattern is decelerating, a slight in crease of altruism within the range below the singularity is counter-selected since it induces a cost that is disproportionately larger than the gain. As a result, the adaptive dyn amics ought to converge to selfishness (Fig. 4A) . If the ancestral population state is suf ficiently altruistic, the adaptive process will result in ever-increasing altruism. This is be cause, with decelerating costs, the cost of altruism increases more slowly than the benefits of altruism resulting from increased relatedness (Fig. 4A) . In real systems, the adaptiv e increase of altruism should be limited by physiological or functional constraints, and the evolutionary process is expected to halt at such a limiting trait value.
Linear Costs
The adaptive dynamics of altruism in species with l inear costs can be classified in two categories according to the cost parameter κ (Fig. 5A ). For species with low κ , costs are said to be "weak linear" and the adaptive dynam ics depend on the mobility rate (Fig.  5C ). For low mobility, the selfish state is invadab le by altruism and the adaptive process leads to the maximum physiologically feasible investment in altruism. Above a threshold on mobility, there exists a positive, rep elling singularity and the adaptive process behaves as in the case of decelerating cost s. If the initial investment in altruism lies below the singularity, the marginal benefit is too low to compensate for the marginal cost, and decreased altruism evolves. Abov e the singularity, the adaptive process causes the rise of altruism up to the physi ological bound. For species with high κ ("strong linear" costs), the selfish state is evol utionarily attractive at any value of the mobility rate (Fig. 5D) .
This pattern can be understood by comparing selecti ve pressures (Figs. 4B, C) . In the case of species with linear costs, the marginal ben efit of altruism, larger than this value, the marginal costs of altru ism always oppose the evolution of altruism (Fig. 4C) . Otherwise, in species with low mobility marginal benefits are sufficiently high in the selfish state to select fo r altruism (Fig. 4B) ; in species with high mobility, marginal benefits exceed marginal costs o nly at high investment in altruism, and selfishness is locally attractive. The mobility threshold, where the stability of selfishness switches from global repulsion to local attraction, is given by the mobility rate l m of a selfish population at which marginal benefits y y q ) 1 ( ⋅ − φ and marginal costs κ equalize:
This relation shows that among slowly reproducing o rganisms (small b), altruism may evolve only in species that exhibit little mobility . In species with very weak linear costs, the mobility threshold may not be observed, for it may exceed the critical value ν
above which the population becomes non-viable (App endix 3,
in Fig.  5A ). As a consequence, selfishness is invaded by al truism at any mobility rate smaller than this critical value, whereas at higher mobilit y, the evolution of decreasing altruism always drives the population to extinction (not sho wn).
Accelerating Costs
With accelerating costs, the cost of altruism is ne gligible compared to the benefits as long as the investment in altruism is not too high, and the selfish state is always invadable. This is in sharp contrast with predictio ns from well-mixed populations, in which selfishness is uninvadable even by only sligh tly altruistic mutants as soon as altruistic individuals incur a non-zero cost (Equat ion (A14) in Appendix 4). As altruistic phenotypes gain a foothold in the population, there are two possible outcomes depending on the combination of cost parameters.
Under a pattern of "slowly accelerating cost" (Fig.  5E ), altruism rises toward a high evolutionary singularity in species with low mobili ty. With higher mobility the adaptive dynamics regime is bistable: the adaptive process c onverges to a high or a low singularity depending on the ancestral state. Exten sive numerical explorations show that the altruism is always obligate (facultative) at th e high (low) singularity. Under a pattern of "rapidly accelerating cost" (Fig. 5F ), the adapt ive dynamics converge monotonously to a low altruistic investment, whatever the ancest ral state (including selfishness). The selected altruistic trait is found to correlate neg atively with mobility. The evolved altruistic interactions shift from facultative to o bligate as the cost parameters γ and or κ increase.
The analysis of selective pressures helps us to und erstand these results (Figs. 4D, E). With slowly accelerating costs, when mobility is lo w, the marginal benefits start high and increase slowly (Fig. 4D) . Then mutant relatedn ess easily opposes the initially low but faster-growing marginal cost. The selective for ce that favors altruism keeps dominating as the investment in altruism increases, until the marginal costs and benefits of altruism balance each other, which occurs at a h igh value of altruism. At higher mobility rates, the initial level of relatedness is lower, yet it remains sufficient for altruism to invade (Fig. 4D) . The increase of relat edness with altruism is slower, which causes the selective pressures to balance at a lowaltruism singularity. Beyond this point, the negative pressure exerted by the cost gr ows smoothly, while the positive pressure catches up rapidly across a range of intermediate investments (Fig. 4D ). This generates a second unstable singularity, above whic h the net selective pressure turns positive again and favors the increase of altruism until a third, attractive singularity is reached at high altruistic investment. With rapidly accelerating costs, the selective pressures balance at a low-altruism singularity (Fi g. 4E). Above the singularity, the net selective pressure against altruism increases, wher eas the positive ecological feedback through relatedness remains weak. Although in gener al there is no analytical expression for the singularities, the selected altruistic trai t reaches a maximum value in the limit where mobility becomes very low, which is given exp licitly by
This maximum is independent of the organism's birth and death rates, and it decreases as the neighborhood size n increases. In species that experience rapidly accelerating costs, the singularity smoothly rises toward * max u as mobility decreases. In contrast, species with slowly accelerating costs fa ll into two main categories: quasiselfish species, and obligatory altruistic species.
In these obligatory altruistic species, the level of altruism is approximately equal to * max u , and thus primarily depends on cost parameters and habitat connectedness.
Evolutionary stability and large mutations
The previous analysis based on the canonical equati on assumes small mutational steps and does not yet address the potential invasibility of attractive states. A locally attractive singularity would give rise to evolutionary branchi ng if it is invadable (Metz et al. 1996) . Evolutionary stability is probed by inspecti ng pairwise invasibility plots (PIPs; Geritz et al. 1998 ) that display the sign of (Fig. 6) . Mutation effects are actually small but not infinitesimal, and even large mutations may occur, albeit rarely. The PIPs also d escribe the invasion potential of mutants that may differ substantially from their re sident progenitors. For species with decelerating costs, the PIPs show that selfishness is locally uninvadable: a slightly altruistic phenotype may no t thrive in a primeval egoistic world. However, large mutations can move the population ou t of the basin of attraction of the selfish state, thus allowing for the adaptive incre ase of altruism (Fig. 6A) . Even starting from a purely selfish population, rare mutations of large effect, together with random drift in a finite size population, makes this occur with certainty, although the waiting time can be long. The case of species with linear c osts is radically different: even very large mutations may not move the population out of the basin of attraction of the selfish state, which is thus globally evolutionary stable (
Figs. 6B, C). In species with accelerating costs, the PIPs indica te that the attractive singularities are uninvadable (Figs. 6D, E) . Starting from any vi able trait value, altruism gradually evolves toward the singularity, which is robust aga inst invasion by any alternative mutant. Large mutations may fail to invade even if they occur in the direction of adaptation predicted by the selection derivative (F igs. 6D, E). This will cause the adaptive process to slow down, all the more as it a pproaches the singularity. The nontrivial zero contour of fitness flattens in respons e to increased mobility, indicating that this "evolutionary slowing down" (Dieckmann and Law 1996) should be more pronounced in more mobile species. m from left to right. The singularity is evolutionarily attra cting and uninvadable by mutations of any size. The inspection of many gene ric pairwise invasibility plots led us to conclude that in our model the continuous evolution of alt ruism never undergoes evolutionary branching. All unspecified parameters in panels A to E are as in Fig. 2B to F, respectively.
Polymorphic simulations
Although our analytical investigation of the evolut ion of altruism incorporates salient features of the ecological and evolutionary process es, it also involves several important simplifications. We assume an infinite lattice size , and describe the ecological dynamics with the standard pair approximation (Appendix 2).
The derivation of the fitness measure relies on the small frequency of mutants as they originate and on the assumption that that the build-up of the mutant's p seudo-equilibrium correlation structure is so fast that it can be regarded as ins tantaneous (Fig. 3) . Furthermore, the deterministic description of the adaptive dynamics is an approximation for the mean path of a stochastic mutation selection-process (Di eckmann and Law 1996) . Individualbased simulations that track the fate of each indiv idual in the population (Appendix 1) provides a natural way to circumvent these limitati ons and can be used to test the robustness of our main findings.
Patterns of invasion can be probed by running a lar ge number of stochastic simulations in which a single individual mutant ari ses in a stable, resident population (Fig. 7A) . We observe a sharp increase of the mutan t local frequency y y q at low values of y p which corresponds to the rapid phase of convergenc e towards the pseudoequilibrium of the mutant correlation structure (i.
e., y y q ) predicted by the pair approximation (Fig. 3) . 
The agreement between stochastic simulations and the deterministi c approximation is satisfactory. In general, the deterministic approximation converges slower than t he stochastic process and underestimates the adapti ve altruistic investment. This may be due to small sys tematic errors introduced by the standard pair approximation. Unspecified parameters as in Fig. 2B to F, respectively. The evolutionary patterns predicted by the canonica l equation can be tested by running individual-based simulations of the mutatio n-selection process in which the assumption that mutants arise one at a time is rela xed, and averaging over a set of simulations (Figs. 7B to F) . In species with decele rating costs, we predict that selfishness is invaded by altruistic phenotypes aft er a potentially long waiting time. Individual-based simulations confirm this predictio n and show that the adaptive increase of altruism starts earlier when mutational effects are larger (Fig. 7B) . Possibly, for very small mutational effects, the corresponding waiting time may be too long for being observed in simulations of feasible duration. In sp ecies with weak linear costs, individual-based simulations confirm both the adapt ive increase of altruism at low mobility and the evolutionary stability of selfishn ess at high mobility, even when very large mutations are feasible (Fig. 7C ). In species with strong linear costs, convergence to selfishness or evolutionary suicide, depending o n mobility, occurs as predicted by the canonical equation (Fig. 7D) . Species with slowly a ccelerating costs are characterized by two clear-cut patterns, namely quasi-selfishness versus high altruism. At intermediate mobility, the adaptive dynamics bistab ility is confirmed by individualbased simulations run from different ancestral cond itions (Fig. 7E ). This implies that alternative adaptive investments can be reached for identical life-history profiles, due to different ancestral states or to contingent events during evolutionary history. Notice also that quasi-selfish states are practically indisting uishable from the stable selfish state of a stochastic mutation-selection process. In species c haracterized by rapidly accelerating costs the individual-based simulations closely matc h the predictions (Fig. 7F) . The negative correlation between selected altruism and mobility expected in this case is confirmed.
Random lattices (featuring randomly assigned connec tions between sites) have been proposed for the purpose of modeling social network s (Rand 1999) . The alternative of a regular habitat geometry, where interactions are li mited to the geographically closest sites, compromises the use of the standard pair app roximation to derive correlation equations for the population dynamics (van Baalen 2 000). Individual-based simulations involving a regular square lattice indicate that ou r main findings are not altered qualitatively whereas selected trait values tend to be higher (results not shown).
Discussion
We study the adaptive dynamics of a quantitative tr ait that measures the individual investment in altruism. The habitat is constant and homogeneous, but selective pressures arise from the phenotypic heterogeneity o f the population. Altruism evolves from selfishness under a gradual kin selection proc ess. This pattern is similar to the continuous evolution of cooperative investment obse rved in a spatial evolutionary game (Killingback et al. 1999) . However, our model is no t restricted to accelerating costs and pure viscosity, which would make up the most favora ble case for the rise of altruism in a selfish population. In fact, we show that the qua litative and quantitative features of the adaptive evolution of altruism depend on the patter ns of the cost and their interactions with mutation, individual mobility and habitat stru cture. Even when an accelerating cost pattern allows altruism to evolve easily from selfi shness (Killingback et al. 1999) , the adaptive increase of altruism appears to be often h alted at very low levels. In contrast, when the cost pattern is decelerating, the selfish state will usually be displaced upon the occurrence of rare mutations of large effects.
Kin Selection, Cooperation and Competition
The conceptual path followed here to define and mea sure fitness differs from the usual approach of kin selection theory (Frank 1998 ; Micho d 1999 for reviews), although the results from both angles can be formulated in simil ar terms. Starting from demographic and behavioral processes operating at the level of individuals and their neighbors, we follow on from van Baalen and Rand (1998) to define fitness as the invasion exponent of a system of correlation equations for the spatia l dynamics of a mutant population. This notion extends the concept of invasion fitness defined for well-mixed populations (Metz et al. 1992; Rand et al. 1994; Ferrière and G atto 1995) . In our model, invasion fitness is found to compound the per capita intrins ic growth rate and the per capita "neighbor-modulated" growth rate (Frank 1998 ) that accounts for the respective effects of competitive and cooperative interactions between a mutant focal individual and mutant versus resident neighbors.
In the terminology of kin selection, this invasion fitness is analogous to a "direct fitness function" from which one can derive a direc t fitness gradient and decipher the selective pressures that operate on the trait under consideration (Frank 1998) . We identify three selective pressures acting on altrui sm: the direct physiological cost to the individual, the indirect beneficial effect of altru istic interactions, and the indirect negative effect of competition for space. According to the analysis of Taylor (1992a Taylor ( , 1992b and Queller (1994) , spatial kin selection mo dels raise a critical difficulty for the evolution of cooperation, because costs of competin g for space with relatives exactly cancel out the benefits of altruism. Similarly, Wil son et al. (1992) concluded "local population regulation often, if not always, cancels the effects of relatedness". We come here to the opposing conclusion that the cost of co mpeting for space with relatives exerts a negligible selective pressure against altr uism, which reemphasizes that kin selection is effective at explaining the evolution of unconditional altruism. This result holds independently of the level of ind ividual mobility; and therefore cannot be attributed to relaxing the "pure viscosit y" hypothesis of traditional kin selection models, according to which only offspring are dispersed (Hamilton 1964) . Also, the explanation involving some disjunction of the social and economic neighborhoods, whereby social partners could be mor e related than competitors (Queller 1992 (Queller , 1994 , does not apply here. Indeed, the expre ssion for the invasion fitness shows clearly that both negative density dependence (comp etition) and positive density dependence (social interactions) are only determine d by the fraction of occupied sites in the same neighborhood. Thus social and economic nei ghborhoods coincide exactly. The key feature of our model therefore lies in the assumption that the habitat offers empty sites for the local spread of altruistic muta nts. This occurs because the demographic death process keeps reopening space in the neighborhood of any focal individual. Consequently, the population does not r each a steady state of saturation, and the selective pressure generated by local competiti on remains negligible. Such a dominant effect of the availability of free space o n the evolution of altruism was anticipated by Taylor (1992b) and Queller (1992, 19 94) who introduced the notion of "population elasticity" to refer to it. In a recent study of a contest of selfishness versus altruism, Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000) included a s imilar effect as generated by environmental stochasticity, and came to the same c onclusion. However, these authors assumed an initial mixture of egoists and altruists instead of a single mutant in a resident background population, which does not addr ess the crucial phase of the invasion process.
Whether it is demographic stochasticity or environm ental stochasticity that underlies the site-opening process is unlikely to make much d ifference as long as there is no feedback of the adaptive trait dynamics on that sto chastic process. This is the case both in our model and in the study by Mitteldorf and Wil son (2000) because the process of site opening amounts to a form of individual mortal ity whereas the altruistic trait affects fecundity. In a different setting where altruism wo uld impact on the individual mortality rate, such a feedback could exist depending on whet her sites are opened by demographic or environmental stochasticity. The ada ptive increase of altruism would reduce the death rate, hence the rate of site openi ng by demographic stochasticity. As a consequence, the selective pressure of local compet ition against altruism would be enhanced, as can be demonstrated by an extension of our analysis (results not shown) and by the studies of Nakamaru et al. (1997 Nakamaru et al. ( , 1998 and Taylor and Irwin (2000) . By contrast, the rate of site opening due to environme ntal stochasticity could remain independent of the adaptive change in altruism. Env ironmental stochasticity might then become critical for the evolution of altruism.
Because the selective pressure resulting from compe tition for open space turns out to be negligible, the criterion for mutant invasion am ounts simply to comparing the marginal physiological cost of altruism to the marg inal benefit withdrawn from interaction with the mutant's own kind. This is a v ariant of Hamilton's rule (Hamilton 1964) , where the coefficient of relatedness is give n by the local frequency of mutants neighboring a focal mutant during the invasion proc ess. That the probability for the recipient of a focal mutant's act also to be a muta nt is the appropriate definition of relatedness has already been shown in kin selection models involving pairwise interactions (Day and Taylor 1998, Frank 1998) . However, such kin selection models assume that relatedness is constant and that the ph enotype of a mutant has no effect on relatedness, which obviously cannot be true when in vasion is a dynamical process and altruism impacts the distribution of individuals ac ross space. The approach first advocated by van Baalen and Rand (1998) and followe d up in this study shows that the same concept of relatedness holds nonetheless. In e ffect, relatedness is a dynamical variable for which the relevant equilibrium value c an be expressed as a function of basic features of the organism's life cycle and behavior (also see Michod 1995, 1996; Hutson and Vickers 1995; van Baalen and Rand 1998) .
Adaptive Patterns of Altruism
The pattern of physiological costs, individual mobi lity, the mutation process and habitat connectedness all interact to determine the adaptiv e dynamics of altruism (Table 2 ). The consideration of decelerating costs is more relevan t to study the rise of altruism from selfishness. In species with decelerating costs, altruism is under the most stringent conditions to evolve from selfishness. However, onc e altruism is established by the mutation-selection process, the population invariab ly evolves toward the physiologically maximum investment. In contrast, th e assumption of accelerating costs is more relevant to study the determinants of adapt ive variation in altruism. In species with accelerating costs, altruism evolves right awa y from selfishness (Killingback et al. 1999) ; but contrary to the case of decelerating cos ts, the evolutionary endpoint is predicted to vary according to the physiological an d ecological parameters. Following on from this dichotomy, an important resu lt is that generically any ancestral selfish population will evolve some degree of altruism. In the case of accelerating costs, the evolution of altruism is no t influenced by the mutation process. On the contrary, assuming that in the primeval self ish state the cost of altruism is decelerating, the adaptive initiation of altruism d epends primarily on the mutation process. We found that higher mutation frequency an d larger mutational steps decrease the waiting time for altruism to evolve. For a give n mutation process, the waiting time also increases with mobility, as higher mobility ca rries a larger direct cost and lowers the indirect benefit of altruism. The study of a li near cost function, which can be interpreted as a degenerate case in between deceler ating or accelerating cost patterns, pinpoints the fallacious consequences that result f rom restricting attention to such a simple case (e.g., Roberts and Sherrat 1998) . Incor porating a strong linear cost in the model completely hides the potential effect of the genetic process on the displacement of selfishness. The assumption of weak linear costs yields a type of bistable adaptiv e dynamics similar to the case of decelerating costs.
However, large mutations have no effect in this case.
Mobility is expected to be an important factor of a daptive variation in altruism, as shown by the study of accelerating costs of altruis m. First, mobility is found to impact on the speed of the adaptive process -the altruistic trait evolves at a slower pace among more mobile individuals. Second, mobility is a significant determinant of the evolutionary endpoint. In species with rapidly acce lerating costs, the selected altruistic trait value correlates negatively with mobility. In species with slowly accelerating costs, mobility has a profound qualitative effect. High al truistic investments evolve in species with low mobility whereas quasi-selfishness evolves in species with high mobility. The finding of altruism being associated with low mobil ity is in line with previous insights into the evolution of cooperation in the Iterated P risoner's Dilemma game (Dugatkin and Wilson 1991; Enquist and Leimar 1993; Hutson an d Vickers 1995; Michod 1995, 1996) , although the mechanisms involve d are different. In these studies, mobility opposes the evolution of altruism by reduc ing the probability of repeated interactions between the same partners. On the empi rical side, many independent studies have related the evolution of complex socia l systems with reduced mobility. For 
Rapidly accelerating costs
Monotonic convergence
• Evolution toward low altruistic investment, correlating negatively with mobility example, the emergence of cooperative breeding in b irds may have been driven by delayed dispersal in a context of intense competiti on for space ("habitat saturation" hypothesis; Emlen 1982 Emlen , 1997 . Also, African mole-r at populations exhibit strong levels of philopatry, and the eusocial species of this mam mal group occur in the harshest habitats, namely arid zones where benefits of group -living are high and dispersal is low (Jarvis et al. 1994; Spinks et al. 2000) .
In species with slowly accelerating costs and low m obility, most variations of altruism between species are expected in response t o differences in physiological costs and the degree of habitat connectedness. Our model outlines the importance of describing and measuring these parameters (Heinsohn and Legge 1999) . Controlled experiments including the analysis of a broad range of levels of investment in altruism would enhance our knowledge of the shape and values of costs of altruism. In reality, the costs of cooperation may impact on different li fe history traits at different periods of the individual lifetime, and these experiments would require multivariate approa ches and long-term studies.
In contrast, in species with slowly accelerating co sts and high mobility, quasiselfishness is expected to evolve. This state is ev entually indistinguishable from a stable selfish population in which slightly altruistic phe notypes would chronically spread by mutation and drift. High altruistic investments cou ld still be observed by the phylogenetic conservation of an ancestrally altruis tic state while a slow environmental change favors an increase in mobility (Fig. 5E ). High altr uistic investment would have evolved under the early low mobility, and be preser ved throughout the subsequent environmental increase of mobility. In support of t he role of phylogenetic conservation, recent comparative analyses of sociality have demon strated a phylogenetic component of sociality in birds (Edwards and Naeem 1993) and different groups of arthropods (Crespi 1996; Wcislo and Danforth 1997 ). High level s of investment in sociality seem to be maintained in more various ecological context s once they evolve from cooperative ancestors. Possibly, a slow, gradual environmental change could even cause the loss of altruistic behavior at very high mobility through t he catastrophic extinction of the population (Fig. 5E ). An environmentally driven los s of sociality may provide another element of explanation for the uneven distribution of social species across taxa (Velicer et al. 1998) .
Our analysis highlights the critical importance of mobility, which we modeled as a fixed parameter. This simplifying assumption may ap ply to species in which mobility is strongly constrained by the environment, the develo pmental program, or the genetic system. Otherwise, mobility and altruism should be entangled in a co-adaptive process, the dynamics of which will be investigates in a for thcoming paper. 
the intrinsic death rate d and the mobility rate
where k (varying from 1 to n) labels each neighboring site, k u is the altruistic investment of a neighbor or zero if that site is em pty at that moment, and full description of the lattice dynamics requires a n infinite hierarchy of dynamical equations, also called correlation equations (Dieck mann and Law 2000) . The system, however, can be closed at any order of description by making use of appropriate approximations. We close the system at the order of pairs with the standard pair approximation (Matsuda et al. 1992, Ferrière and Le Galliard 2001) . This is the simplest approximation as it assumes that third-order correl ations just vanish, and it has been used to construct correlation equations for spatial games (Nakamaru et al. 1997 ) and social interactions (Matsuda et al. 1992) .
We first describe the temporal dynamics of the freq uency of occupied sites. We assume that a fixed number of phenotypes are presen t in the population initially. We use the indices i and j to label phenotypes, and more generally the indice s k or l to designate the state of a site, including the empty state 0. We proceed by averaging the local birth rate (A1) over the lattice, which after some algebr a yields the average birth rate of a type i individual at time t: 
We now describe the temporal dynamics of the local frequency of sites. As local frequencies are simply determined by pair frequenci es according to
where ) (t p ki designates the frequency of ki pairs at time t, it is enough to describe the dynamics of the frequencies of pairs involved in (A 5) to obtain equations for the local frequencies involved in (A4). An inventory of all d ifferent events that may affect any type of pairs at time t yields three elementary fluxes (van Baalen and Rand 1998, Rand 1999 
Appendix 3 -Monomorphic population
A monomorphic version of the analytical model can b e derived from (A4) and (A10). We assume there is only one phenotype and we denote by x the state of an occupied site. We are interested here in the feasible population e quilibria. According to equation (A4), the non-trivial population equilibrium (A12)
We now analyze the viability and stability of the e quilibria if b is sufficiently larger than d. The resident population is non-viable when no rea l solution exists for , the maximal root of (A11) corresponds to a viable equil ibrium that is globally stable. In the disjunct sub-domain of obligate altruism, this solu tion is locally stable and coexists with the locally stable, trivial solution. A saddle poin t separates these two locally attractive solutions. The resident population goes extinct whe n the saddle point collides with the upper boundary, which leads to a second extinction domain adjacent to the first one.
Appendix 4 -Dimorphic population
Here we make use of the general polymorphic equatio ns (A4) and (A10) 
As pointed out by van Baalen and Rand (1998) , the m ean-field version of system (A13) with selfishness ( x type) and altruism ( y type) interacting on the lattice is given by 
This system readily shows that selfishness is uninv adable because it benefits from the same amount of altruism without paying the costs. T his serves to highlight that spatial population heterogeneity is a key prerequisite for the invasion of altruism in a selfish world. 
Appendix 5 -Invasion structure and fitness
For the degenerate mutant, x y = , we can solve analytically the non-linear system ( A15) using symbolic resolution (e.g., Mathematica). This yields the solutions 
from which we derive the selection derivative (3) a t the limit where ε vanishes. Next, we use the non-linear system (A15) to solve for the a and b terms introduced before and to evaluate numerically the different components of (A17).
